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THE IMPACT OF THE 

REPEAL OF THE STOCK­

FOR-DEBT EXCEPTION ON 

CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY 

RESTRUCTURINGS 

William D. Terando 
Wayne H. Shaw· 
Introduction 
This paper examines the effect of the repeaf of the stock-fm­
debl exception on corporate bankruptcy restfllcturings. This 
exception permitted corporations to exclude CancelJation o( 
lndebtedness (COD) income from gross income provided they 
exchanged their own common equity fo .. debt whi Ie in Chapter 
11. Because no COD income was recognized, the bankrupt 
corporation also avoIded any redut.1ion in tax atlributes (prima ..• 
ily Net Operating tossest or NOls). Under the new raw, finns 
{hal restructure in Chapter 11 are required to recognize COO 
income but can defer current taxation on tnese amounts by 
reducing NOls by a like-amount 
Prior researcn has provided contrasting assessments as to the 
importance of this exception to bankruptcy filers and differing 
predictions as to their response to its repeal. Betker [1995J 
claims that most bankrupt firms received little. if any, benefit 
from avoiding COD income under the prior law because their 
debt restructure method required them to incur a greater than 
fifty-point change In underlying ownership (O'Nnership change). 
As il result, they were forced to rely on another advanrageous 
exception provided in the tilx code (ownership change rule 
bankruptcy exception) to preservE! NOls because [pg. 4J: "'it 
puts a less restrictive limitation on the annual use of NOLs.'" 
Since the change in tax law repealed the tax exception that fjrms 
did not rely on (stock-for-debt exception) and left substantiaHy 
• "fhe author.; are, res.pe.;;tively, ell Iowa. State Univers.iry ;toO $(Mhem Meth­
odil>t Univer:sity. 
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intact the -exception that firms did rely on (ownership change 
rule bankruptcy exception), Betker's {lq951 findings imply that 
the c:nange in tax law sl10uid not have a significant impact On 
corporate bankruptcy restructuring;. 
In contrast, Easton n9941 asserts that the repeal is "the single 
most signiflcant change in tax law governiog bankruptcy" 
because it requires firms that exchange common equity with 
debt-holders (or impaired debt to reduce .one of thejr most 
valuable assets: NOL tax auributes. This reductiol1 t in turn, 
reduces the NOt tax benefit available to firms that trigger an 
ownership change in bankruptcy because the deferral of COD 
income and the application of the ownership change rule 
bankruptcy exceptioll are not necessarily independent: to the 
extent firms have rower available NOLs the ability of the 
ownership change bankruptcy exception to pre~rve NOls is 
also reducEd. Newton and Wertheim (1993) predict tnat bank­
rupt firms will respond to the im::reased tax cost of using 
l:ommon equity under the new law by issuing more debt. This 
allows them to reduce the amount of COD income recognized 
and approximate the NOl tax benefits available to bankruptcy 
filers under the prior law. They exprESS concern, however, that 
this. strategy will reduce lhe probabrlity of the firm incurring a 
successful bankruptcy restructuring by forcing it to exit Chapter 
11 with relatively higher levels of debt in their capital structure. 
We predict they will have incentive to do so when the marginal 
lax benefit of preserving NOL tax attributes exceeds the mar­
ginal financial statement costs ofexiUng bankruptcy with more 
debt. 
We examine these competing prediclions using a sample of 
firms that successfully emerged from Chapter J1 between 1994 
and 2004. We show that. under the current law, bankruptcy 
filers continued to issue common equity in sufficient amounts 
to trigger an ownership change when restructuring impaired 
debt with debt-holders. Consistent with Easton [1994], how~ 
ever, we find that the deferral of COD income increased the 
tax cos.t of common equity and in many cases forced bankruptcy 
filers to altflr how they restructured in Chapter 11 to preserve 
NOls. The specific response, however, is more complicated 
than that suggested by NeViton and Wertheim {1993J because 
tile change in tax law divides firms into three sub-groups based 
on tne trade-off between tht! tax benefits of preserving NOt tax 
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attributes and the related financial reporting costs of issuing 
more debt.' 
The first group consists of firf115 that recognized COD income 
in excess of NOl tax attributes. Consistent with Easton [1994J, 
the repeal imposed a significant explicit tax cost on this group 
by eliminating the NOl tax benefit they would have rE!(;:eived 
under the prior law from triggering an ownership change in 
bankruptcy. In addition to eliminating their post-emergence 
NOh, these firms were also required to m.ake additional reduc­
tions to their other tax attributes (primarily the bases or deprecia­
ble assets) by the amount of excess COD income recognized 
(averagi ng S147 mill ion per firm}. Despite these €>eplicit tax 
costs, we snow thatthey<wefe precluded (rom issuing more debt 
because the marginal financial rctx>rting costs of doing so far 
exceeded the marginal tax benefit that could be obtained from 
preserving additional NOl tax attrihutes. 
The second set of firms continued to benefit from receiving 
a less restrictive annual limitation on NOL tax attributes. Consis~ 
tent with the concerns of Newton and Wertheim (1993), these 
firms responded to the change in the tax law by issuing more 
debt. This allowed them to SCllI'e approximately $]3 million of 
additional post-emergence NOLs (in present value, or PV 
terms), as opposed to a workout, but also forced them to exit 
Chapter 11 with Significantly higher debt ratios and lower 
profitability. We provide evidence suggesting that this strategy 
was efficienl because the marginal tax benefits of preserving 
NOL tax attributes for this group exceeded the marginal finan­
cial reporting costs of exiting bankruptcy with higher debt levels 
and reduced profitability. 
Rather than issuing more debt, (he final group of firms elected 
to reduce rhe adverse rax (:osts associated with the change in 
tax law by choosing an alternative provision under the owner­
ship change rule bankruptcy exception that provides for a one· 
lime reduction in NOt tax attributes. This alternative restru<:tur­
ing method allowed them to save approximately $77 million 
of post-emerRence NOLs (or 92.6% of pre·restructure as.<;ets) by 
restruc.turing in ralher than out of bankruptcy, and exit bank& 
ruptcy with relatively lower debt ratios. 
1 A Iotlrth small sub-group vi firms. le~fru(;tured primarily the tcfm~ or exiSl­
ing ct~·bl contral1s and were primarily unaf(ec.:.red by the t:hange in tax law. 
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Our conrribution to the literature is twofold. First, we show 
how the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception impacted the tax 
benefit provided by the ownership change bankruptcy excep­
tion to firms that restructure in Chaptet 11, Second, we show 
how the change in tax law provided incentive to these firms 
to alter how they restructured in bankruptcy to preserve this 
benefit and the importance of financial statement incentives in 
this decision. The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. Section two contains institutional iJ1formation regarding 
the Chapter 11 bankruptcy process. -rhe effect of taxes on 
bankruptcy restru1.1urings before and after the change in tax law 
is examined in Sedion three. The hypotheses are developed in 
Section four and [he sample selection method is discussed in 
section five. Section six contains research design while the 
results are presented in Section seven. Our conclusions are 
presented In section eight. 
Chapter 11 
Tne rules and regulations governing the bankruptcy process 
are contained iJ1 Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
(Chapter 1 1). Manag@ment is allowed to retain control of the 
firm after it enter> into bankruptcy and has the exclusive right 
to propose the first plan of reo1'ganization to the Bankruptcy 
Court (Court)." This plan must be submitted within 120 days 
(or as late as 180 days) of the initial bankruptcy filing date. If 
a plan is not submitted within this timeframe. any creditor dass 
can propose their own reorganization plan. Each plan must 
assign daimholders to various classes and propose an exchange 
of property (cash or securities) by the firm for the debt held by 
each designated class. -rhe value of property distributed is 
determined by the absolute priority rule, under which a creditor 
class is compensated for the face value of pre-.bankrupocy claims 
only after the daims of each class deSignated as senior are 
resolved. Plan acceptance requires an affirmative vote by a 
majority (two-thirds in value and one-half in number) of daim~ 
holders in each class and is binding on all participants. To break 
deadlocks, the Court can unilateriilily impose or "cram-down" 
on dis~nting dasses a reorganization plan that it deems to be 
IIfair and equitable". 
lI'rhe Court can also appoint 3 [rulree 1.0 OVI:!~ opera.tioos if il1appmpriate 
conduct on the part of maf}~emel1f is l!JSpecred. 
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!n the late } 980'5, a hybrid form of bankruplcy, called a 
prepackaged bankruptcy (prepak) began appearing in the mar­
ketplace. Prepacks are simifar to workouts in the sense that a 
firm negotiates a reorganization plan with its creditors prior to 
entering lnto Chapter 11 [McConnell and Servais, 1993). On 
the other hand, they are similar to traditional Chapter ! 1 
bankruptcies because the r~organilation occurs under the 
auspice5 of the Court In most cast'S, the bankruptcy p~tition 
and reorganization plan are filed concurrently with vote on the 
reorganization plan occurring either snortly before (pre-voted) 
or after (p05t-Vot't..lo(j} the finn enters into Chapter 11. 
Tax Consequences of Restructuring in Bankruptcy 
P!.io! Tax La,,! 
Prior to 1995, the two most commonly cited tax conse­
quences of restructuring in Chapter 11 were avoiding COD 
income and preserving NOls {Betker. 19951. Corporate dis­
cnarge of indebtednCi5 gives rise to ordinary income when the 
cash and value of property used to si.ltisfy impaired debt is less 
than its adjusted issue price.:. In this event. COD income arises 
beC:::<luse the assets a debtor would otherwi5e be rt.--quired to 
apply towards debt repayment are now (ree to be used fOf other 
purposes." Under the stock-for-debt exception, firms could 
exclude COD income from gross income pro'Vided tney ex· 
changed tneir own stock to creditors tOf impaired debt white 
in Chapter 11.- Because no COO income was recognized, the 
.J COJ) iocume is chclra~il£d 01$ ()(dlnary ("ther th.ln cilpit,d gain income 
SirK"OO sal~ or t"x<.-hange i!> deemed to have OC(urred [lRC Regulation Section 
1.lll· lid !.m. 
• Firms sh,.Jt U!>e ca~h (Of new debt) tD reslroc:lure imj)aired debt in (hdpM 
I} l.111 defer current rtc'Cognitivll of COO illwme under the bankruptcy 
exr.ej:IUon by reducing fax attributes bv a !ike amoont per IRe Section H18(a). 
Under the ordering ru!~. NOb are fi~t reduced but Iht> debl:or may also elect 
to reduce other l,i)x ..ttrif>utes tsych as the' bases ot depre(iabl~ :aS$eIS, gel'lHal 
rn..sin<'Ss credits, alternative minimum tax credits, net capit.oll lo'>scs, piIls;ve 
ac..tivily losses Clnd ioreigl1 lall. {.redih}. 
• 'fht> exception was created through a liot'ries of rudki .. l dE'ci~jon~. Set' e.!., 
Commissioner v. Cdpl"l'Ito Sec. Corp., 47 8. LA. 1>91 (1 (42), nol1<ttq•• ;i(ff'fl 
}4n ~ ,~u ,;92 0 111 Cir. 1944); Alcazar tfott'l Inc. V. Cummissiol1et", 1 T.e. 
on 1194}1 acq.; Claridge Ap,lrtments Co. V. Commis~jo".,r, 1 T.C U) 
(!9~2.l, rev'd in p.'Irt. US f. 2<1962 (7111 Or. 1943); rev'd on uther groonQs, 
323 U.S. 14) (l944). ac:q.; Commi~lijoner v. r.iotor Mart Trust, 4 T.e. 9'11 
094.')) aff'd, 1SIl r. 2d t22 (1" Or. I(46), d(.q.; TOWCf Bldg. Corp. v. 
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corporation al~o avoided any reduction in tax attributes.- The 
exception was based on two perceived charac::teristics of the 
impaired debt: (1) tnat it was merely being replaced with a 
corporate stock liability (Pratt, 2004), and (2) its fair market 
value (fMV) of the debt represented the anticipatory subscrip· 
tion price of the common stock ultimately issued [Si!\'ef'man and 
Keyes, 19(2).7' 
MiHer {19911 suggt."5ts (hat the primary lax cost of restructur­
Ing with common equity i5 associated with the triggering of an 
ownership change under IRe Section 382. This occurs when 
a group of 5 percent (or greater) shareholders increase their 
ownership percentage o( qualifying stock (by value) by more 
than fifty-percentage points during a three-year look-back pe­
riod.- In this event, the amount of Hpre-change'" NOls that can 
be applied against "post-cnange" taxable income is limited on 
an annual basis to the product of the firm's i.lpre-cnange" equity 
market capitalization and the applicable federal long-term tax~ 
exempt rate (annual limitation). If an ownership change is 
triggered while tne firm is in Chapter 11 J however, the tax code 
allow5 bankrupt finns to choose between two special provisions 
contained within a special exception to the ownership c::hange 
rules (Ownership Change Rule Bankruptcy Exception) to 
Commissioner, b r.c. 125 {1946}, acq., Rev. Rut. 59.22.2,1959-1 C.B. aD; 
TAM 873000);TA.M 37j.,){I07; T M18735006. Congre5$ indirectly rectJ.8oiled 
this l!'xc:eptioo in the 8ankruptcy Act of 1980 by adding lRC Section 108(e)(8} 
to limit its ilvailabihly '0 ('(>"ain corporilliolls, 
61n cases where bud.. Slocle and non-stock consideratiun was e~harlged 
in sa'isb,clion of debt, the non-sloe1\: consideration WilS, applied iil'St 10 lhe 
debt equal to !he 'Value of such cOnllidl:!'ration, with the stock satisfying the 
remainder. This allowed finn!' to exclude the eobre amount of the COO in­
come undeJ me stock~for-dd:>t exception CVef) though only a portion of the 
(,Qn~idoralion t;onsisted of l'Ummon equity. 
7 -rite stock-for-debt e"ception doe; not apply to "nominat or Iolen" issues 
of <:vmmon t.'quily (IRe Secriorl 108(e){8)(A,) Of Iv eKcnanges of "disqu.1lifJed 
stock" (preferred stot.:k} lot impai«'d debt (IRe Sec.tion 106(eJ(10)(B)), Firms 
Ihat elN "insolvent'" lbook value of liabilities il)lC~ the fair market value of 
assets) but not in ChJ.prcr 11 may .1150 utili.z~ the stock-for-debt exc.eption 
but only to the e~nt of their ir'lKllve'l1cy. 'rhe t;ost of proving insolvency com 
be alloided, however. by simply restnKluring in father than Otlt 01 Chapter 
1 1 • 
eQualifyiJ'lg lolOCk ior I~ porpose mdeterminins whether ~n ownership 
change has been tri~ includes balh Commoll equity and common equity 
oquivalen~, such a~ stock ()pti011!!., (.;o~rtible ~ferrod stock, .)Ild con~rlible 
debt. 
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preserve NOl tax attributes. The first provision {enhanced 
valuation provj.~ion) provides for a less restrictive annual limita­
tion amount by including in its. computational formula the value 
of post~change equity market capitalir.ation. In most cases this 
is likely to result in a highef NOl annual limitation ammlfit 
since the firm is able to include the value of common equity 
issued while in Chapter 11 in its computational formula.· The 
second provision (artribute reduction provjsion) allows corpora­
tions. to use their NOl tax a.ttributes without limitation in the 
post·bi.mkruptcy period. t. Unrestricted NOl utilization in the 
post-cnange period comes at oil cost,. however. Firstl each firm 
must incur a one·rime NOL reduction ftoll charge) by: (1} one­
half of the COO income that would have been recognized but 
for the !:>tock-for~debt exception, and (2) the ~mount of interest 
expense incurred in the previous three years leading up to and 
including the year of bankruptcy.1t Second. they must canyon 
a. significant amount of pre-change business in the post-change 
period and avoid ~dditional common equity sufficient (0 trigger­
ing a second ownership change within two Yl;?3fS or risk losing 
all remaining NOLs. Weitzner [1994J suggests that firms chose 
will choose the attribute reduction provision when the net 
benefit that It provides (PV of post-emergence NOls less cost 
of rt!stricted use of assets/financing options) exceeds the PV of 
posr,emergence NOls tax benefit provided by the enhancoo 
valuation provision. 
Change ;n the Tax l.aw 
The repeal of the stock· for-debt exception is included as a 
parI of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
(OBRA93). The new law applies to all corporate bankruptcy 
(esrrucrurings after 1994, except IOf bankruptcy ~titions filed 
-IRe Section 382(1)(6). 
to Firms qualify {or this exct1)tion when their -pre-ch.mge" shareholOt>~ and 
hislol ir: credilorS receive t.:ummol'! equity ff~preie"tios mort:' than 50% OJ the 
owll<.'r!>hip of the newly reorganized company. 
1"1 Beard l} 993, pg. Jh11;" The rationale lot the iflle~s.t e)(pense redoction 
j~ that the equity interesl ret'E:'i\led by the l:~itor iKtui:llly ilr01i'E! well in 
.1dv,mce Of the reo~Al1izatio". In effoct, .IS /he losies of the l"Ofpordtion 
..,cumulate, Inc creditor gradually <1!il$UIl'le!o the tmition of ~...reholder, Wlmt 
wa5 originally dt'(/ucted.iIS interest expenS(', ill'ld ..dded to the IO!;$ corporations 
NOb, is now characterized a~ dillidetld5. Since dividl"l'lds are nondeducfible. 
Ih(! dt'!du(tioos for interest are eliminated from the NOLs," 
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priOf to January 1, 1994. Under the new law, firms that ex­
change common equity for deb[ are required to recognize COD 
income upon debt discharge. Current taxation on these amounts 
is deferred using the bankruptcy exception by reducing NOt 
tax attributes by a like-amount While 00 changes were made 
under the new law to the annual limitation computational 
formula under the enhanced valuation exception, OBRA93 
changed the statutory formula used to compute the one-time 
NOL reduction under the tax attribute redudion eXf;eption. 
Under the new rules, the NOl toll charge indudes only the 
interest expense adjustment to conform to the repeal of the 
stock·for-debt exception. 
Hypotheses Development 
Betker fl99S] examines the relative importance of the stock­
for-debt and owners.hip cha.nge rufe bankruptcy exceptions to 
firms that restructured in Chapt4;!f" 11 under the prior law and 
suggests that tile primary tax benefit of restructuring in Chapter 
11 during this rime period was not in preserving NOls per ~ 
by a.voidlng COD income. This is for two reasons. first, most 
sample firms would have been able to exclude their COD 
income had they reorganized as a workout due to insolvency 
considerations. Second, no firm would have incurred current 
taxes from debt forgiveness had they reorganiled as a work­
our. ta Rather, he concludes that the primary benefit of restruc­
turing in Chapter 11 is that [pg. 4]: .... it puts a less restrictive 
limitation on the annual use of NOls'" rdative to a workout 
because the advantageous provisions. of the ownership change 
bankruptcy exception are not available to firms that restructure 
out of bankruptcy. He estimates that the PV of future taxes saved 
by firms rhal triggered an ownership change in rather than out 
of bankruptcy was approximately $9 million per firm, or 3% 
of total assets, 
Since the change in tax law repealed the tax exception that 
firms did not rely on !stock-for-debt exception) left substantially 
intat1 the exception (hat firms did rely on (ownership change 
rule bankruptcy exceplion), 8etker's {19951 findings imply that 
the change in tax law will have lirtle, if any, impad on corporate 
'2 Most sample firms in his >tudy triggered an (JWoelship l:hange while in 
Chapter 11, TheS(' firms primcltily elecfed the enhanced valuation pmvi~ion 
since they would have lost all (ur slJb~faJ1tiillly "Ii) oi their NOt lax attribiJte:J 
hdd Ihey e-Ieded the attribute reduction provision. 
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bankruptcy restructurings. Under the currenllaw, it is expected 
that bankrupt firms will continue to rely on the le5s restrictive 
annual NOL usage provisions of tne enhanced valuation provi~ 
sion to minimIze the relative cost of using common equity to 
restructure impaired debt. This is stated in the following hypoth­
esis (s.tated in the null form): 
Hl: 	 The repeal of th,g stock-for-debt exception will not cffect 
how firms reorganize in Chapter 11 
Eilston (1994), in contrast, asserts (hat tne repeal of the stock­
for-.debt provision i~ "likely the single most significant change 
in the tax law governing bankruptcy'" and "is a complete 
turnaround from prior policies designed to help financially 
distressed corporations to make a fresh start," He suggests that 
the cha.nge in emphasis from exclusion to deferral of COD 
income under the new law will decrease the value of bankrupt 
firms by requiring them to reduce one of their most valuable 
asse(s by the amount of COD income recognized: NOl tax 
attributes. This in turn reduces the NOl tax benefit from trigger~ 
ing an ownership change in bankruptcy since there are fewer 
NOI s avai lable to be preserved upon appl ication of the owner­
ship change bankruptcy exception. 
We Hlustrate the impact of the repeal of the stock-far-debt 
{>xception on NOl tax attributes using the following example_ 
Assume that Company X enters into Cnapter 11 with NOl tax 
attributes of $lO~OOO that will expire in 20 years. Assume also 
that it triggers an ownership change by exchanging common 
equity with debt-holders for impairl>d debt (which it has paid 
interest eXp€flse in the amount of $3,000 in the previous throe 
years), realizing COD income in the amount of $5,000. As 
snown in Figure 1 'Panel A), under prior-law rules firms could 
exclude COD income from gross income and not reduce NOl 
lax attributes under the stock-for-dcbt exception p(uvid~ they 
restructured in Chapter 11 _The firm mus.t also decide to limit 
post-emergence NOls by electing either the enhanced valua­
tion or attribute reduction provisions of the ownership change 
rule bankruptcy exception. Assuming the enhanced valuation 
p(Qvision is chosen and the less restrictive annual limitation 
amount is computed to be $500 per year ($50 if the reorganiza­
tion occurs as a workout due to the relatively low value of 
common equity attributable to the former shareholder group), 
the hankrupt firm is restricted to using their pre~change NOls 
:. ",. 
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over the entire 20 year post-change period, 'I~ Assuming a 6% 
discount rate, this reduces the PV of post-emergence NOls to 
$5.297 (figure 1, column 3). Under rhe attribute reduction 
exception, pre-<:nange NOls are reduced by the appropriate toll 
charge (50% of the COD recognized and the interest expense 
toll charge to 53,500). The PV of post-change NOLs under 
either provision are 5tH! higher than had the firm reorganized 
as a workout {$1 ,059) due to the deferral of COO income and 
application of the ownership change rule restrictions and em­
phasizes the NOL tax benefit of triggering an ownership change 
in rather than out of bankruptcy, In contrast; under the current~ 
law rules. each firm is required to recognize COD income and 
reduce NOl tax attributes regardless Qf whether the restructUI'~ 
ing occurs in or out of Chapter 11. If the restructuring occurs 
while the firm is in Chapter 11, firms that elect the enhanced 
valuation exception experience" reduction in the number of 
years that it can carryforward its annual limitatiQn amount that 
the firm (from 20 to 10 years) because there are fewer pre­
change NOls available to be pre;e(Ved. This in turn reduces 
their level of post·emergence NOLs (in PV terms) by $1,617 
(trom $5,297 to S3,680) as opposed to restructuring undet' the 
prior-law. firms that elect the attribute reductiQn exception 
experien<::e an incremental reduction to NOL tax attributes 
equal to 50% of the previously excluded COD income, or 
$2,500 (from $4.500 to $2,000). These reductions do not 
completely eliminate the tax benefit of triggering an ownership 
change in rather than out of bankruptcy due to the substantial 
restrictions on annual NOt utilization to firms that restructure 
out-of-court, 
Newton and Weltheim [l993t predict that bankrupt firms will 
respond to the increased tax cost or using common equity under 
the current law by issuing more debt.." For example, assume 
a debtor exchanges common equity with debt-holders for 
impaired debt and has the option to: (1) recognize COD ill­
come, or {l) discnarge the difference between the market value 
'S. this aswmes that the finn was !lOt insolvent at the time it restructured. 
If an ownership change WINe not abo triggered, the avplic:atiol'l of the s-tock­
(or-debt eKceplilin 'lflow$ Chapler 11 firm!; Iv exit bankruptcy with $5,000 
more NOtOJ 3s opposed 10 n:l'Structuring as a woriaJut. 
~"In e~lreme ca~! Easton (1994) sugg~ts that the Ims of NOL t.u aft1i· 
butes will provide incontive for bankrupt finns to liquid.ilte under Chilptef' 7 
r.ilther than reorganize as an on-going business. concern under Chapter 11. 
~Vol.!l5. NI),4--<IlIII'I I'ullSlD) 
92.3 Repeal of Stock·Fof-Debl Exception on Restructurings 
of rhe stock and the tax basis of the impaired debt through the 
is.suance of a very long-term note with a face amount equal to 
the tax basis of the debt that has the minimum allowed interest 
rate to avoid the Original Issue Discount Ru'es. In many cases 
the second option will be chosen because it reduces the amount 
of COD income recognized and allows the firm to approximate 
post-emergence NOl levels available under the prior law. It 
also allows the bankrupt firm to continue receiving the non-tax 
benefits of common equity issuance in Chapter 1 t. 1. 
There are, however, costs associated witn (his strategy. First. 
issuing more debt redu(:es the firm's long-term survival pros­
pects by leaving the bankrupt firm with more debt in its capital 
structure. 1t also r~uce5 post-bankruptcy profitabltity througn 
increas,E$ in future interest expense charges. Prior research 
suggests these two factors may be important in the firm's trade­
off between obtaining tax benefib and incurring financial 
statement costs (Matsunaga, Shevlin and Shores [19911). If the 
tax benefit from issuing more debt is not positive, then the 
related financial reponing costs are not relevant. Hcwe~, lor 
positive net tax benefits, firms will have incentive to issue more 
debt when the marginal tax benefit of pl'eserving NOls exceeds 
the marginal financial reporting costs of issuing lTIO(e debt. The 
empirical test of this trade-off is as follows: (stated in the 
arternative form): 
H1 A: 	 firms that restructure in Chapter 11 under the current 
law will issue nlore debt if the marginal tax benefit of 
preserving NOL tax attributes exceeds tne financial 
reporting marginal costs. of issuing more debt. 
... OetraKi<.lI;he (1995] suggests IhClf non-I'llc considerOltions play ... primary 
ruJ~ in its use (or .J. number of reasons. First. when .. distres!!.ed firm is not 
w.ry pru{itctble and reorgani.z~s in bankrup(<:Y, it must obtain suhstarllial debt 
forgiven!:!..!; in order tv ~ulVi~ as a going t:oncern. In thi!> instance, common 
equity allnw5 creditnrs to grant debtors thfiO debf ro~iveness rht."Y need 10 
survive while retaining tile up.~itJe potential to reco~r metr originai invest­
ment through future increa~ in firm value. It also m:vgnizes milt the creditor 
""55 nas gradually a~stJmed the pns.itkm Qi de facto equity stakehoh:kr ~nd 
provides them influenc.:e OW!r fu1ure bu!;ine5S decisions. Debtor! ..Iso benefil 
as I::xchcmging impa~red deb. for common equity increase. the probability of 
it SU(.;I:t"!Istul reslruc.:(uring by a"uwing the (irm to emerge from ba'lkruptcy with 
les!; <l~bt in their capital struc.1ure. 
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Sample Selection Method 
Current-Law Firm} 
We used the lEXIS/NEXIS database to identify firms that 
reorganized in bankruptcy between 1995 and 2004 (Curront· 
Law firms). This search resulted in an initial sample of 120 
firmi. We eliminated 33 firms that did not have the necessary 
pre-Firing financial statement information in the year prior to 
filing for bankruptcy and/or descriptive information detailing 
their bankruptcy restructure plan. Finally, we eliminated eight 
firms that resolved their bankruptcy restructuring by merging 
with another firm, eleven bankruptcles involving foreign owned 
corporations and non-corporate entities (S·Corps), and seven 
firms whose bankruptc:y filing was limited to one of its subsidia­
ries. This resulted in a final sample of 61 firms. Most sample 
firms emerged from bankruptcy between 1997 and 2000 (56) 
with the highest number of resorution.s in 1997 (16 fil1ils). Sixty 
firms had SIC codes between 1000 and 7000, with fifteen firms 
ha.....ing SIC codes in the- Sooo ranges. This sample consish; of 
38 firms. restructured using the traditional Chapter 11 bank­
ruptcy filing process (traditional chapter 11 firms) and 23 firms 
that restructured using prepackaged bankruptcies (prepaks). 
Prior-L'ilw Firms 
Using the NMRs database, we obtained a comparison sam­
ple of c:orporations lhat emerged from bankruptcy between 
1987 and 1994 (prior-Law Firms). 'I. This group helps us to 
understand wherher the tax and non-tax characteristics of 
bankruptc:y filers .....aried across tax regimes. We considered onlY 
firms that emerged from bankruptcy after 1986 to coincide with 
the enactment of the ownership change rules as a part of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). Consistent with the repeal 
t"1he NMRS and I EXISIN[XIS dalabas.es af{! used as the p'im~ry sources 
for our seall;h for two ftSIsons. First. Ihey rontai(l a l.ltge ~ of pubHdy t(~ded 
companies including Ihose traded on the New York. American, and OTC stock 
exchanges. Seco"d. they include firms involyed in cash and exchange 
cli'ferings as well as public offeringr. and private pi ilct'menfS. To supplement 
HleSt! data SOIJf(ei, howeller, we also iden(lfied bankrlJpf firm!! uliing the 
Natronal Ne~per Index, National Mag~zine Index, the Bal'lkrupf.Cy Data· 
source, and 8ankruptcy.com. We ~se the NMR5 databa~ as a SQlJrce to 
select the prior-law firm sample sinc;e it j{Jcludes p;..iblk filings throlJgh 1994. 
We use the LfXl5INEXlS database <IS one source to SE'lect out current-l1lW 
sample group sioce it includes plJblic: filings from 199.1) ro Ihe (:l.Jtrent date. 
1'iQtJ3. No.4-(1iIIl1 ~t 
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of the stock-for.-debt exception, the sample period only extends 
through '1994. This group is chosen using the same criteria as 
the current-law firm group and consists of 44 firms. MO!tt of 
these firms emerged from bankruptcy between lQ90 and 1992 
(J8} and had SIC codes betwE'en 1000 and 7000 (41). This 
sample consists of 26 traditional Chapter 11 firms and 18 
prepaks, 
Description of Empirical Tests and R.esult! 
fin<mcial and Re-sltl1cture Profiles 
Pre-bankruptcy financial profile$ for tile current and prior-law 
firm groups are presented in Table 1, Panel A.'" i3<ltn sets of 
firms are, on average, of similar size {total assets and net sales}, 
nave simHar liquidity and property levers, and catty similar debt 
loads into bankruptcy. In addition, they both incurred signifi& 
cant losses in the period leading up (0 bankruptcy. Current-law 
fi(ms, however, were Significantly less profitable in the pre-filing 
period with a negative 41.6% return on average assets c:om~ 
pared to a negative 17.3% return on average assets tor the prior­
law group. Consistent with this finding, 58 currentalaw firms 
entered Chapter 11 with pre-existing NOb; averaging 94'%, of 
pre-bankruptcy assets. In contrast, 42 of the 44 prior-law firms 
entered Chapter 11 with NOLs averaging only 55% of pre­
bankruptcy asselS. 
We find also that a majority {54 out of 61 ) of current-law Finns 
exchanged common equity with debt-holders for impaired debl, 
with the (Offner creditor group owning, on average, 75.9% or 
the outsranding common equity of tHe newly reorganized firm 
<Pand B). This per(:entage is comparable to simi lar former debt­
horder equity ownership percentages (or prior law firms 
{68.7%). U Reliance on common equity resulted in 53 
t7 Fifty-ei,;hl C'urrellt-j,lw firm!> acbptl:'d fn>.sh-~lal1 repvt1irtg in d(Otddnce 
Wifh the AJ"m'rit:an fnsUtute of <:ertlfied Publ i< Ac(()untants Stat~mt!nt o{ 
Pusitilu'I CJO-7 "Financial R~por'liog by Fntities in Roorganization Under the 
Bankruptcy Code". 0' these finn1l, 56 wrote down their assets to fair market 
v,(!lol', As .. result, lhe rt'lalive size imd results of oper.ltiOlls of the prede<:e!>Wf 
;.ma ~'Iccessor compal1ies are not compar.lble and not presented in !his 
~a:tiQn.t. Th~~ (lWfl~hip percenli1~ are also consistent with !timilar stc1tisti(.s 
reported in other ~ludics. For example, Tilshj;.:\n. I e<lw" and M~·Connt'1i [19%1 
show rhat creditors owned 64.5% of post.bankruptt:y common ~uiry (I' firms 
(hal filed prep<tckaged oonkrllptdes between ll)/lO arKl1993. GiiSOll [19c;1(») 
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cunent·law sample firms t86.91l/n) triggering all ownel'ship 
change {OC firms).• • This is similar to the percentage of firms 
triggering an ownership change in the prior-law group (36 of 
42 firms/ or 85.7%). The remaining 8 current-law firms (13.1%) 
did not issue sufficient !evels of common equity to trigger an 
ownership change (NOC firms}. 
Finally, there was Httle change in the magnitude of COD 
income recognized by bankruptcy filers in the current·law 
period. Current·law firms reaHzed COO income averaging 
46.6% of pre-bankruptcy assets, c:ompared to an average COD 
income level of 40.1 % of pre·bankruptcy assets for the prior-law 
group. Tnese results suggest t!'lat current-law firms continued 
to rely on the combination of issuing common equity to and 
obtaining debt forgiveness from creditors to restructure or 
replace impaired debt. 
Impact of the ChanS!! itt the Tax Law Oil Tax Attribut~ 
fn this section, we examine whether the lax cost of uSing 
common equity increased as a result of the change in tax law. 
Using the current~law firm sample, we estimate what the PV 
of post-emergence NOl tax attributes woufd have been assum­
ing the prior-law rules were in effect. We compare these 
amounts to the PVof actual post~emergence NOls. All amounts 
are scaled by each firms:' total assets in the year prio,. to entering 
into bankruptcy to ~move any size effects that occurred during 
the bankruptcy process. We separate t!'le analysis between the 
OC and NOC firms since the change in tax law impacts the 
NOt tax flttributes of each sub-group differently. 
Our initial results suggest that the change in tax law had a 
relatively small impact on NOt. tax attribute levels. As shown 
in Table 2 (column 1), the application of the ownership change 
and Wefs~ 11990J provide ~imilar ~u't.s by showing thilt (re!Hmrs held 79.2% 
and 7t .1% of the' po5t.rooQSaniz.Uiun equity of firms that restruclured uliing 
t~ Iraditional ChapltN" 11 bankruptcy pmc:ess. 
t. Fifty DC firms were directly impacted by me change in tax law because 
they exchanged common l'(Juhy with debt·holden. Three OC firms I1'lggered 
arH11Nnersnip change I'lot were not impdCted by fuechange in tax law because 
lh~y issued common equity to Ihii'd partie5. All tests peri"ormed in this sl.\.idy 
Oil the DC firm sub-llteJup indude all :')3 iirm~. rhi> allow.. us to determine 
the impact of the change in tax '.lW un the NOl lax be~ftt to all fitm5 that 
trigger.m ownen;hip change in Chapter 11. Aillests performed in this $IUd" 
were ~run using just the 50 OC firms directly impacted by the change in 
talC law with no cnange in any inferonces beil'l8 noted. 
(VoW. No.4--()JKJ1 PIih$lfl) 
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rule ba"kruptcy exception under the prior law signiiicantly 
reduced the PV ot NOL tax attributes of OC firms from 95,94% 
to 56.1 J% of pre-bankruptcy assets. In contrast, the incremental 
(eduction in NOl tax attributes attributable to the change in 
tax law only reduced NOls bv 18.15% of pre-bankruptcy as!icts 
(from 56.93% to 37.98% of p..e-bankruptcy assets). This reduc­
tion is not significant at tne usual lEvels (one·tailed). Simila ..'y, 
the si>:·percentage point inc:rem£>ntal reduction (70.48% to 
64.56% of pre-..estruL1ure assets) in NOL tax attributes for the 
NOC firms was also small. This is because only th..ee finns in 
this group exchange s~ common equity to debt-holders for 
impaired debt and received minimal amoun(s of debt 
forgiveness, 
We find, however, that the above analysis underestimates lhe 
overall impact that the change in tax law had on Chapter 11 
filel'5 because it does 110t take into consideration Its effect on 
their other tax attributes. We take this factor into consideration 
by examining the individual effect that deferring COD income 
and tne ownership change bankruptcy exception had on each 
firm's tax attributes. As shown in Table 3, we find that the 
change in tax law divided the OC firm set into three distinct 
groups. Con~istent with Easton n9941, 1J ex: firms (COD firms) 
incurred significant explicit tax costs attributable to the changE" 
in tax law because they recognized COD income in excess of 
their NOl lax attributes (column 1). To avoid current taxation 
on the COD income n.'Cogllized (averaging $271 million per 
firm;. they were forced to eliminate all of their NOl tax dttri· 
butes {averaging $124 million or 61.8% of pre-bankruptcy 
assets}. In addition to losing the tax advantage of triggering an 
ownership change in bankruptcy, they also lost future depreda· 
tion deductions because they were also required to reduce the 
baldnces of other tax altributes (p..imarily (he adjusted bases of 
depreciable assets) by the amount of excess COD income 
recognized (averaging $147 million per iirm, or 26.4% of pre­
bankruptcy assets). 
Sl'cond, in contrast to Betker 1199.51, we sh(Jw thilt eighteen 
OC iirms elected the attribute provision as a means to preserve 
NOt!) fAR firms) despite the asset sale a.nd limmdng restrictions 
it pl~lCes on the firm in (he post-bankruptcy periud. As -shown 
in l.lble .3, Column 4, AR firms entered Chapfer 11 with high 
NOt. oluribute levels averaging 186,.51 % of pre·b.mkruptcy 
.(ISSC1S:. While (he COD income recognized (averaging 65.57% 
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of pre-bankruptcy assets} is comparable to the COD income 
recognized by COO fiO'lls, the AR firms, because of their large 
NOls, were still able tu rE:!t~in NOl tax attributes averaging 
120.94% of pre-bankruptcy assets. These firms also benefited 
from the reduced one-time NOltoli charge afforded to this 
provision under the current law to exit bankruptcy with NOL 
tax attributes averaging 95.45% of pre-bankruptcy assets, or $82 
mimon per firm. Had AR firms elected the enhanced valuation 
provision, we estimate that they would have exited bankruptcy 
with NOls averaging $37 million (in PV terms), or 21.10% of 
pre-bankruptCy assets. As a result, electing the attribute reduc­
tion over the enhanced valuation provision allowed these firms. 
to preserve an additional $45 million in NOl tax attributes (or 
74.400/0. of pre-bankruptcy assets). These mean differences (in 
dollars Of percentages) are significant at the 0.01 level (one-­
tailed), In addition, we estimate that AR firms would have 
recognized NOl tax attribute levers of only $5 million or 2.90% 
of pre-bankruptcy assets, had they had reorganized in a work­
out. As a result, they were able to emerge from bankruptcy with 
additional NOt. tax aHribute5 averaging $77 million, or 92.6% 
of pre·restructure assets, by re;truc:turing in bankruptcy, relative 
to a workout. These differences are significant at the 0,01 level 
of significance (one-tailed). 
The remaining 21 ex::: firms continued to use the enhanced 
valuation provision to preserve NOls (EV firms). Consistent with 
Setker 119951, had they elected the .attribute reduction provi­
sion, most would have lost substanlially all (0( afl) of their NOL 
tax attributes.- Similar to COO firms, EV firms are character~ 
ized by relatively tower fevels of pre-bankruptcy NOL levels 
{57.4% of pre-restructure assets). However, they were able to 
retain significant tax benefits; averaging $33 million per firm 
or 12.7% of pre·bankruptcy assets, in part because they recog· 
nized significantly smaller amounts of COD income than AR 
or COD firms. 
Debt. Rr;.>5truclVre Characteristics 
in this section, we examine whether firms issued more debt 
to minimize the adverse impact of the change in tax law on 
NOt t~x attributes. ThIS is done by comparing Ihe relative mix 
ao Throe tirm~ elected the enh.'lnC.ed v~luation provi!tion because their debt 
restructure m~hod did nnt allow them to qualify for ItIe attribute reduction 
j)ro\lision. 
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of cash. securities (common equity or debt) and debt forgiveness 
given in consideration for impaIred debt by current-law firms 
to similar percentages utilized by prior-law firms. All amounts 
are stated as a percentage of total debt (~structured. A research 
finding that current law bankruptcy filers Issued more debt in 
bankruptcy to reduce COD income level$ is consistent with tne 
prediction of Newton and Wertheim [19931. On the other ha.nd, 
results that indka1e that bankrupt firms did not alter- now they 
restructure their debt under the current law are consistent with 
the assertion of Betker [1995J. 
The rest! Its of tne debt restructure mix comparisons are shown 
in P,lnel A o( Table 4. We pres(!nt results separately for EV, AR 
and COO firms since the previous test indicate$ that EV firms 
realized rower COD income levels that AR/COD firms. The 
results for current-l.aw firms are presented in Panel A. Panel 8 
includes tht! restructurE! statistics for the prior-law group. COD 
firms dId not exist in the prior period since their 1055 of NOls 
can be traced dire<:tly to the repeal of the stoCk~for-debt excep­
tion. The prediction of Newton and Wenheim (1993) that firms 
would utilize more debt in bankruptcy are supported only for 
the EV group. These firms exchanged significantly higher levels 
of new debt in reorganization (averaging 21.81% of impaired 
debt) than prior·law EV firms (averaging 11 .16% of impaired 
debt). in addition, the percentage of new debt in the cUfTent·law 
EV firm reorganization package was significantly higher than 
tne amount of debt issued by either current-raw AR firms 
(averaging 11.51% o( impaired debt) or COD firms (averaging 
9.15% of impaired debtl. Consistent with the results noted in 
the previous test, the higher issuance of EV firm debt was mel 
by a commensurate decrease in the amount of debt forgiveness 
~averaging 34.85% of impaired debt). This percentage was 
sigmficantly lower than comparable amounts realized by prior­
law f.V firms (averaging 46.32% of impaired debt>, current law 
AR (.weraging 52.03% of impaired debt> and COD firms (aver­
aging 58.57% of impaired debt). On the other hand, the mix 
of c.;lsh, stock, debt and debt forgiveness offered by current-law 
AR iirms for impaired debt did nol differ (rom the packages of 
AR iirms from the prior period or COD firms in the current 
period.2'f Finally, we show that NOC were largely unaffedcd 
2' (no firms did nul e~j~t in the prior petittd since Iheir los!> of NOh can 
Uto lr,It:1:'d (iirec:rly to the repe<ll of the s.tock-for-dd1t elt.ception. 
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by the change in tax law because they primarily used cash to 
pay down impaired debt or restructured the terms of existing 
debt contracts. 
To unde~taJ1d why only EV firms issued more debt, we 
estimate their associated marginal tax benefit and financial 
reporting costs. We include in this analysis AR/COD firms but 
exdude NOC firms irom consideration since they were largely 
unaffected by the cha.nge in tax law. For EV firms, we es.timate 
what their po5t~emergence NOl. debt and pre-tax profitability 
levels would have been had they elected to maintain their debt 
usage at prior-period levels (approximately 11 .16% of impaired 
debt). We then compare these estimated amounts to actual post· 
emergence levels ror these variables. The results, as shown in 
Table 5, column 1. s~ow that rhe reduction in the level deOO 
income due to increased debt utilization allowed EV firms to 
increase post-emergence NOl tax attributei (in PV terms) by 
76.41 %, from 10.&% to 18.7% of post-emergence assets. This 
benefit was realized despite an incremental increase of post­
emergem::e debt loads of only 31 .61 % and reduction in post­
bankruptcy profitability ot 6.13%. These results are consistent 
with hypothesis Hl A,a Increased debt utilization in Chapter 
11 increased post-emergence debt ratios from 42% (based on 
our estimate of what po~t"emergence debt ralios would have 
bc!en had EV firms maintained debt usage at prior period levels) 
to 56% of post-emergence asset's. The "'as-if'" percentage is 
comparable to similar post-emergence debt ratios for prior-law 
EV firms and current-law AR and COD firms. In contrast, their 
actllal posf-emergence debt ratios are significantly higher (at tl1e 
0.01 level, two-tailed. than simHar ratios for AR and COD firms. 
These results consistent with the concerns of Newton and 
Wertheim [19931 that the increased debt usage of firms in 
response to the change in tax law would forte bankruptcy filers 
-It is possible, howfoVer. mal EV firm1i issued more debt 00( necessarily 
to preserve NOls but rather because !bey hlld the debt capa6ly to do w. 
We test for this pos.sibility by oomparjl'lg EV fifm post-bankruptcy debt levels 
to ~Imilar amounts lOt' AR ar1(i COD rrrms. AlQuming that tV finns maintained 
their dt!bt usage at prior period levels, we es~imate that thev would h.ave­
emerKE!d from Chapfer 11 with post-bankruptcy debt ratios averaging 42% 
[)I post-emergence total assels. This ratio is higher (though 001. signiticanlly 
so) Ihan similat' ratiV5 for AR firms (averaging )6% of luLlI po5t.em~nce 
total a~li!:!ts) and COD linns (;lverilging 28% of po5t-emergence Iotoll anets). 
This result mes flO( suppoi1 this allt.'ITlative exp4anation for intreased EV finn 
debt uliage. 
q31 Repeal of Stock·For·Ocbt Exception on Restructurings 
(0 emerge from bankruptcy with morl? debt in theIr capital 
structure. 
In contrast, we find that AR and COO firms would not have 
benefited from issuing more debt under the current law. Assum­
ing that AR firms issued more debt in bankruptcy equal to levels 
maintained by EV firms (approximately 21.81% of impaired 
debt}. they would have only realil.ed an 8% increase in their 
level of post~emergence NOls while incurring an 80% increase 
in post-emergence debt as the reiatively large NOl t<lX attribute 
batances result in relatively lOWEr marginal tax benefits from 
issuing more debt. COD firms also would not have benefited 
from issuing more debt because only 4 or 13 firms would have 
preserved any NOls tax attributes by increasing their debt 
usage. This is because COD recugnized by the other 9 firms 
would still have excreded pre-existing NOl tax attribute levels, 
even after the additional debt issuances. The small NOl tax 
savings would have come at the cost of a 94% increase in 
current debt levels and a doubling of their pre-tax losses. These 
results suggest that firms trade~ff the tax benefits of preserving 
NOls against the financial reporting costs of higher debt loads 
and reduced profitability. 
Prepackaged vef3:US Tfddition,,1 Chi:lph?r 11 Bankrul!,tcies 
Prior research has suggested tha( taxes ma.y play a role in 
encouraging firms to file a prepackaged Chapter 11 reorganiza­
tion for two reasons (McConnell and Servais, 1993). first. 
prepaks know their debt restructure method (and availab'e tax 
benefits) prior to filing for bankruptcy. Second, prepaks may 
represent a low-cost way of achleving these benefits because 
the length of time (and cost) that tne firm is expected to stay 
in bankruptcy is le'is because most creditors have already 
agreed to the terms of the restructuring plan {Tashjian, lease 
and McConnell, 1996). Because of these daims, we next 
examine pr-epaks and traditional Chapter 11 fi..ms separately to 
ensure that are results are not driven by one of the groups. 
\\'e find that no support for concerns that inc.entives for 
prepaks vs. other filers. might lead to differing tax results. 
Instead, we find that prepaks and traditional chaptet' 11 firms 
recognized similar levels of COD. While prepaks rccognlzed 
sligntiy higher COD income levels than traditional chapter 11 
filers (53 5% vs. 42.5% of pre-restructure assets). the mean 
difference is not Significant at the usual leve!s. 1n addition, the 
Ai 
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relative:! composition of prepaks between EV, AR, COO and 
NOC firms is similar to the traditional Chapter 11 group. Of 
interest is that 8 of 23 prepaks were willing to restructure in 
Chapler 11 without receivjng any tax related benefits. One 
prepak debt reslructure pian did not require the triggering of 
an own(!r~hjp change and seven prepaks recognized COD 
income in excess of pre-restructure NOls. Of the remaining 15 
firms, 8 elected the enhanced valuation exception while" firms 
chose the attribute reduction exception. As wirh the lraditional 
chapter 11 group, both EV and AR prepaks preserved significanl 
NOl levels upon emerging from bankruptcy. however, the 
prImary benefit from triggering an ownership change in bank~ 
ruptcy was attributable to AR firms.. Finally, we show that both 
traditional Chapter 11 and prepak EV firms Issued more debt 
in bankruptcy as compared to AR or COO firms in order to 
preserve the NOL tax attribute. As a result, il a.ppears that firms 
that restru<.1ure using the traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
process as we" as those that use prepackaged bankrUptcies 
value the tax benefits provided by the ownership change bank­
ruptcy exception similarly. 
Conclusions 
This paper investigates how the repeal of the stock-for-deht 
exception how firms restrudured while in Chapter t 1. Consis­
tent with claims made by Easton (J 994}] , we find that the 
change in tax law imposed significant explicit lax costs 011 
bankruptcy illers. Despite these costs, we find that many of 
these firms altered their debt restructure method to preserve 
NOls and reduca their cost of equity. We document that 
concerns raised by Newton and Wertheim {1993) are justified 
since almost half of our sample firms issued significant levers 
of debt while in Chap[cr 11. Additionally, approximately a third 
of these firms responded to the change in lax law to preserve 
NOls by ele<.."ting an alteroati...e provision available under the 
owner!Yhip change rule bankruptcy exception that allows for a 
one-time reduction in NOl tax attributes. We also show that 
the remaining fIrms were precluded from changing their debt 
restructure method, despite the loss of all of their NOL tax 
attributes, becaose the financial reporting marginal costs of 
doing SO exceeded any marginal tax benefits that might have 
been generated. Finally, we find that the imp.ld of the repeal 
of the stock-lor-dent exception on corporate bankruptcy 
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reorganizations was similar for firms that filed for prepackaged 
bankruptcies and fkms that restructured using the traditional 
Chapter 11 process. We conclude that. in addition to non,talC 
factors, taxes appear to be an important consideralion in how 
firms restructure while in Chapter 11. 
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EnhaIII:ed Aftn1:JUte RfduCiiOTl 
Panel A: 
PrIor I..,.. 
Pn:-D~ NOls S10.000 $10.000 110.000 
Les~: <,:'00 Inc:orrc: (S,OOO) 
Rcd~goo 
Net NOLs 10,000 10.000 5,000 
lzss: OwllCrsIlip Cban.f: (3.941, 
~m: 
las: Ow~rslljp CIIaa~ 
fJa.nlrurtq RatridiuruI: 
E'nhana;d (4.100, 
Vai_ion; 
Aurillule I~.SOO) 
RedIEUOII; 
PclI;t-BR NOLs 5.1,97 4.500 1,Q!9 
I'lbIor:I s; 
CIIJ:'RDt lA.... 
Pn::-BR NOLs SIO.OOl SIO.~ SIO.(Q) 
~: con rnCOItK: (5.000) t5.0Il1) (.~.OOO) 
R.ed!K;tKIII 
NetNOl.$ 5.00} 5,I'n'l 3.000 
Leal: OwllCrship ChanJC: {l.94 I) 
!laI.ri~1ioIl5; 
La,: Owncnhip CIwI~ 
BilnJuupb:)' ~a(ricliDIIII: 
flnlmla:d l 1,.U(J} 
VallJ:IIIjuu; 
.-\ttl'i.tlt* 
~~ioII: 
I't!M·BJ. NOLII. 1,680­ loW> 1.n.W 
~-BRNOl...'! Repa!!StnlS pn:. blllk.nJpll:y ~L t;Jll lLUribule&. 
roo IIItOIIlI RqIn:o.!IeIWl n:U1.Jelion in Nca Iu; ittrlblllrf. :.ttribl.bbac 10 
R.lr:b::tioo Jhc Ik'l'erraJ of COO inr.ume. 
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Itcpr!:RJlts the reduction in IhI: PV I)r NOL In iIttri~ 
due to u.: IIIlpticlilioll ut lhe I)wnmhip eban,e bl!nkn!plcy 
1'II!r;~O!l. 

Itepmoellb ~ion io. the PV uf NOll'. asslJ.lDin, that tbl; 

rum e!CC:1i to ~1Ie NOI..I Ullin, !he enlwlolx! vallWiol1 

jlfOVi.siOll. 

Represent' miuctio'll in fbi: PV of NOLs IS5UIlIillll 61. the 

fifJII eleeti to pre~ NOLs I~\in& thr. auribwe m.!nc:tim 

pm'Iillion. 

Reprt$e1llS the PV or JIOII'-e!l'lI!rjle!1QC NOL II.~ IIlU'ibulfS 

IIISSUmid& III uWlIoI:nhip cha"F tIa$ tAlen t.d. 

Rcp~ the PV of .tiRlill!)d !'oiOL tu. anribules 

a5sumin; !be r!rJD had l'C:(1J~b.c'd l1li .II 'Hl)rkoot. 

'fable 1 
CUMpUl10Wft vI t"inwlejal. nIX urul RmJVr.rure Proji/f!J 
Vlriat-lc 	 C!II"Rm[·I,aw PrlEX'-Law 
Htll\5.- I;itm..." 
Pautl A: Prt-R'Ibc 
FInImdII Pro.. 
1\55111" 221.461 20l.~61 
Saln 194,226 ll2,.l7S 
Cutn:1lt 1I:1IOn '2.947 2.2'Oi 
Pf'E K;,W.o 0.36:1 11.325 
Do:bt ~ un! n.82:5 
BOA -'l..:I.] 0 ·O.t73°· 
NOlI.tIIIria O.'Y.l~ 0550t 
Pa.ae18:~ 
PnlIIles 
EqIJ;ty bio 0.7:59 0.687 
COD R1aUtt: 1..1.466 OAOI 
Indi.clJcs sigairlCllft~ • dlc 0.0;; 1e~1 usi. a tw~ided test. fill" AMlCiS 
and ~ the rDeaIl ditTemlllX kIllS II!: j'lCrfia'axId llSio, the lWIlutal lug 
8IlJOU1'Ib;. 
A 	 Cu.tn:1It-Law flrmI AKlfJlmiled io bukrup!1.'}' bctwilc:n 1995 lind !004. 
Sample ,i1lC is 61 f,l'ffII,. Prior-Law fitms reorpnizaJ in bllll'lknlplcy 
be;tWiileI 1987 and 1994. Sa1npl\l ,iu: is 44 1innI;. 
TOOlI. auets irI !.he )'CIII.' price '0 nliq fur banbuptcy. All'IDIIIlll presenmd 
.wore :mc:diM afllOlJ.Rt9.. 
N« &aIn in the: year prior to fthn£ f(W: ba~y. Amo1llllS pn:!!S4il1lkd 
iW lhCdian .-ru>lI1U. 
Tb!:: meat nr egm.n( 6'III:U divIded by alma( Jiahilidcs (less !he cllOall 
portion of 1Mg.teml ddll) It rhe end of t~ jUt' pri« to filinS f(lf 
ban~IM'Y· 

'Thr: meat of IICI ~y phms lind IIqwpllxm divk\lCd by IOLW 1.'I.Sd.t II 

Ihr. end "r the rear priut to /iIi.. f~ tllUltropICy. 
MIliA of : Slim of loog tcm'l ckbI ~11lS rhe C\lrn1U pl1rtion tI! lonr;'1e11D 
debt (Ii. vide!! by loa.! Id",,~ aI. the c$d of lhe year pri~ t(l filiAl. ler 
bdknlptey. 
kOA 	 The mean of nel inr::I)IUC (bIlfi)ft ~m.-utdilWy ik:Jnr. ano Will) di\'ldl;d 
by avet.J&l: 1IW15 at Ihe eod or '!be l"CUt priot Itt ruillg tnr brIInknqMq. 
l\.kaa of Not. w. iJ.IIribule> divided by rota! ~ at lilt: end "l the: year 
priuc 10 fili~ fnr b.uIknlpt~. 
Ptm:e-,e of r.:UI.\ImI:ln tlqllit)' 1D _ly n:~iu:d tirm held by 
debt-h.il~". 
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COD klltio 	 COD i/lQ)lI'Ire t'eIlOPized scaled b, rota! ~ al Ihr:: end of It.; 1QI' 
prilli' to tHi1l1 (Of bankrupte)'. 
Table 1 
IflertPfUMwl COlli MU)(:/«rN With ClIMgt 111 1(jx 14JW 
lAlS4:riplion OC Fir&A NOC fIimIs" 
1"rl::-8k NOi.sI 0.9;94 Q.']Oq 
Prior Lcl...· R{!fillrJifllll lO.39II, (<t.OOOO) 
Fri"r-Law N0liI,8 0.5613" 0.7048 
Cl4rrtll.l I.,..• RIIfiM("ti",,1 (0.181S) (O.05~:Z) 
"_-BR NOu· 0.319& 0.6(56 
Meurt difft:n:ftl'le bt.!twllell (1) P.re·BR I'IOLs ¥s. 014 I..owt 
NOl..s, or (2) Old L..... NOLr. Q:. PtIIit-BR NOLa is 
~i,&iIi.fil;llIlt .. the O.SII- 1eooel usilll • one-sided tat. 
OC IiI1n$ III\l IOII1IPIe t"lrms that Lri..rcd DWlJC11imp 
cJdtIfi. Sample size iI S:; firms. !'fOC ftnm did not 
lriacr an owncn;l1ip .:hanp. 5unple m.e ia 8 (D'I'tIIi. 
B 	 All allIOOL1lS 3l!l lCaIed b)' toIal UIlII:U in .. yw prior 
w fiIillS for baninJpt(;y. 
fve.BR NOLs Repmc:nts 'pre·btnlml~1 No(' IU ~, 
Prior Law Rt:doctioo 1tttl1'tKn!& lbt: reduairJll iJ) «be fYV of NOL b1.. ~ 
under the prior ......... 

ReprewnlS the pV of poR-bankruptc)' NOt.. IP. anribula 

undc:r the prillr Iii.... 

~~I1'S rtw: rcQIJctioo in ta.: I'V M NOl. IBX at:trl~ 

lIflribllla!:lJe «l the ctlaqe in ~ law, 

I'tJ&t-BR NOl.s 	 RepmieOiJ, lhe PV uf pau-emetgella; NOL tall aluiboleS 
under the CWRllt'laW. 
Table 3 
AN.riY.fi.~ (if con WilPM aNi awllu.vnip C1raJr!J'! Illilf: Reslril:limr., INI NOb. 
OC firms' 
Variable EV AR COD NOC F""'" 
Fi~ Hr'IIIf' f~ 
Pn:-8R 0.5740 1.86511 O.35J4~ 0.7041 
NOua 
lI.\ss: COD (O.3:S64) lCl.65S1Jl (0.617:41)1 (0.059'1) 
R.eduction" 
Net NOu· 0,1176' 1.2094"',1 0.0000' 0.6456 
uS$: OC (O.O!U6) lO.2.S48Jl {O.f~) (0.000:1) 
Rule 
RelitJidkJ.. a 
Patf-BR 0,1)4\) O.oooot 0.6456 
NOLa" 
WmktNt 0.0290' 0.0000 0.64-'6 
NQI..$. 
I\.lCIIJI d.i~Clce~ hetWCI:lI: (I) P!l:·RR NOLs ..... Nel NOLs,. (Z) Net 
NUl ... 11$. PoJI-8R NOLs, 01' (3) ~·8R NOlI \IS. Wcn.ool NOU is 
siPlificut lit the 0.10. O.~, (r O.fIl k"dl., TC-.'i('C(.1:i ....ely, U5iDJ_ 

iJllC·r.ilcd 1l:.'It. 

McaJI diffi:~noe bcf\t\oeen (I} EV 3IId AR rllll\S Of (2) .EV ...... COD 

IimlSo is IOignili(aDt ilt the 0.01 IUId o.~ 1ew:1~ Ilf sipificaooe, 

respt:(Ii...eiy. lDiiag Iwn-!3iicd te:stI. 
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OC firms III'C £II1'I\I. tiIIl tnl;gero! n.... nerstill chan"" {s.ampll: 5i& is S3l. 
The: DC IimI groop d di~ itllo !hm: ~: EV fi.nslS elected I~ 
f:!Ihan~ valuation Cltcqlli.:lll (54IlT.Tp1t ~ite is 21); A'R finno da:[ed die: 
.Dibole mhsction provision (wnplc ~11.C is IS); COl) (inns; did Q\ll 
ilellefit from 1ri~8Crl... an ~hjp change bca.Iue Ihcir COD i!I(1)'!.M 
~ pnl-l:lar:!.knlpU:y r«lL tax lII.{ribllles (Mmpk: IiiIJll IJ fiInut. NOC 
rums 1ft fil't115 tIIa1 did lIat lria;er all \lWJ1~ cli4In.\I'C (SarIl'le &j:z.c is 
8). 
B All amooDls ate scilkd by IUlaJ aw:t~ ill the yew priur to lilin$ Car 
l;iar1bvpU:y. 
Pre·ilR Rcpn:5CIIfS pre-banlcrupli:}' NOL I!IX atttibules. 
NOLs 
COD krptl!SCOU roducrioa in NOt.. tIU attributtl ..nbwabJe » COD incO'/'llC 
R~tioa fWQPilioD IIllder thi: ~1Iot law. 
OC Repmrcpb. lite reduction in ,he f'V or NOL 1.llJl anrib4n& due to lhe 
Rl:dlX'!ion .applicalilm of !he ownmhip cbange bIIlkNptIlj' nUe UlXlfllioo. 
Posl-UR Repn:&el'ltll Ihc PV or poS!~mcrg.mQt NOL Iv; attribllll'lS. 
Not.", 
WUftQ1Jl Refjle!lCift6 thr PV of eSlimaIl:ldN<X.In.I1.ibUleSI5$Utt1.i1\g dle fimJ tu.d 
NOL; I'l!!.~xd » I wothU. 
Table 4 
AIlalyJ!,s of OC Firtlf I)tbl R~li/rl4etul'f .v~tbud 
Cun't'llt-Law 
Vlrnu.... 
came 
Common I:'qJilr 
IlebtC 
Debt 1Jisc:~e 
PaDd B: Prior-Law 
f:iirJ 
Casne': 
('lJOlJJIOO f.qunr 
OcI:tlC 
Debf Oil!chul!t!;: 
OCfllll15 
EV A'R COD NO(' Fil'llll 
Fi~ filTM" f"~ 
9.96 7.9~ 4.34 29.0:3" 
.l3.38 2&51 21.95 9.88' 
lUll 11.51·' 9.14'- 41.4.16· 
34.11:5 ~:!.f~l'" S8.j1'" 14.0.\­
7.171 1~.26 l2.)1 
34.'9 28.60 11.19 
II.I~ 9.IS 37.~B 
%..)22. 4.99 28.99 
,. Meu diffilrence bctwe.ea (1) f,v SlId AR fllPl5 !iIId (2) EV ;111(1 COD 
IiI"ll"G IIIld (3) EV rrl"lT1l!o wad NOC fiml5 i!; sigrrificlIlIl • I~ O.(t\ level of 
slllllifiClllK'e UIoidg iI 1W~·lailcd le&t. 
Mean difference bcl_ CIlt.rent L_ IIl'Id Prior-'a",' fU"lll MOOUftt, i$ 
'irniflQlllt III 1.he 0.00 level uf ~jglljfiC8llQl (two-tailed li;:5I). 
A ~ OC fi rID pDlIp j, divided. II1I1l three gTOtlpIIi: EV firms clctlCd. t.hr 
c:nhamled valll8tiOIl cmccpciOG {smlpll: ~ is lZ tor l~nt-Ij)"" tinn5 and 
24 foc prillr-law (jnm;~ AR fmllS elc:Clod lhi: tllirilrutc R:duc.1XI1tl ptWkioo 
(~1e rJu Is 111 fur tum:1Ii·law tirms and 3 tor pr1tw-law firmn; COO 
til'lT15o did 001 be!leflt from tri&&cring :IJ\ D'Wnr:nh.ip \'i1an~ I!r:t:auK lhei, 
000 ilXorne ~ pre·rat['llClure NOLs (s....,1t: size 13 foc 
COfl't:lII-la'lll rut~). NOC firma; ore flf'll1& thai did fIOl lri.r ... ClWIlIldNp 
H 
dtmge (sample size iiO g fur CUrTI:nl I:.!.... .tifl1'ls and 6 ror priOf·law 1'i1"ll"G). 
ClIm:RI-Luw ril'!l'lS l'CIQrpIliZl':d ill NTlkrapll!)' between 1911:; IlJId 2004. 
SatrIpIe six is 61 filTllS. PriOJl-l.aw ....11'J11i !'eOfgI¥Ii~ ill OOnktupIq 
0,:1_ 1997 and 1994. SIII..1e size i~ 44 firms. There is [lC~ II COD 
rltln _poup with \he prior-Isw firms due t~ Ita!: appiiL:alioo of f1'lc: 
stud· rm'-..Jtbt Il!l'lXprion. 
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C 	 RCpreKiRts telatiYI! amoonl of cash /wnJmoo equityldelltldebt f<qi~ 
UIIICd to ~piaoe impaited dcht. All IfflOUfll5 am stlted .... ~p: of 
\he tmI ~bt discllarl:Jed in bdnIptcy. 
TIMeS 

&mefits tmJ (.itl/s rJf bIlling 1,,:ldilWIflJI D,rb, 

NOL· DEB-re ItO,,­
I'add A: EV t1nIIe 
As Ir: No Additionat Debe BM:haI!ged 0.100 0.421 .Q.\60 
N:t1&aI 0.137'" 0.}6l'" -4.180 
t'etcelll ~(~) 7~.41 " 3161.. (U3'1o) 
had II: AR. rrrJ 
Actual 
A5 If: Issued More Dt-bt 
PI:~ InerQIC (0ec1'l:il:Wll) 
PIt.tId c: (.."00 J!b:mIo 
Anbat 0.000 0.369 ·0.030 
Ail Ir~ IaKOOd Moll'l Deb! 
h.n:elt OtanI!: 
0.00Nt'" O.1l'· 94.3111 -0.000 (loo.QOIi) 
Mean 4if'rcrmcc ~Ii ~...... .., 	 ..Act ...... Inll "As·if' l!8lOOJlI.Ii: i~ sil'1irlaMll • 
0.10. OJ). Ie\'lll of silDi~ (lJIIr",aikd). 
A 	 TIle OC 6rm group ill di\lided iato tbme poops: EV firlm eJedJ:,d ~ 
~ Va/Wlaoo J::I(eption (saIllf"ic si;a! is 21); AR finnII Llledlld tb; 
BIlribvle ~lICtiDIIl jII"t:IVi$i"" (1IIq:IIe siI.e ia 1S); roD firms did IIOf bt:nc:ftt 
1'ron1 mglJ.illj'l lilt ~ip change OOcautl! I.hr:ir COD iOCOOJe eXl:~ 
pn:-~~ NOLs (~ size 13 fltW). 
8 	 NOt n:pR~t ... PV of post~ltIIlf'IIence NOt IIU ..mblila. DEBT is, tlH::: 
sum uf IOOi-lCf1TI debt plWi It.: cum:11( portion or UJnr-llmll dcbI. Bolli NOL 
aDd DEBT an: QW lJy I«4l 8,!;K~ • lhe end of t¥ ~ aftu lICit rum 
Crl"Iltpld fnlm hanlTuptcy. ROA i..!; !he p!1:__ tehlm OIl a~ asKII 
{before e.ttta-ontinlDy ilelR!l} ill tlw: first )"0lIl" .r adI. r...... eD¥:op:d fio.m 
bal1luuplcy. 
C 	 'rhis '1IIlysis euirlllllcs the }'V or 1I'l61-e_rpCl: NOl..a, DEBT IIIId ROil. 
IWllmin, thai ~Kh £\1 rll1ll did 001 isslle [a(."I1mII:lQlly ~ ..,. U} 
ds:btholde.,. lit ;,:ompaII!d bJ prior-law flm\S. Tbc5e ....if" eidmare8 :an! !hen 
~ '0 IdUlli 8IIIOOlI15 for NOJA DEBT. IIDIi lOA. 
D 	 This aMI)'m I:lliRlllln lhe PV of ~·cI11lltgflDre NOLa. DEBT lUId ROA 
wwnirlg !hal e~ AR aDd COD iAsl.IC4 illC~lIWll)' ~ debt to 
debllloldm si.ulilar en F.V flmw. Thcac: "¥-it~ estimalls ~ IIw:o compared 
Iii IICt\IIJ a.TIIOOJtlS fur NOlA. DEBT. IU1d kOI\ 
